




Mail agents				
• MUA = Mail User Agent				
• Interacts directly with the end user				
Pine, MH, Elm, mutt, mail, Eudora, Mulberry, Pegasus, Outlook, Thunderbird, web browsers				
• Multiple MUAs on one system – end user choice				
• MTA = Mail Transfer Agent				
<ul> <li>Receives and delivers messages</li> <li>Sendmail, Smail, Exim, qmail, Postfix,</li> </ul>				
<ul> <li>Only one fully active MTA per system – sysadmin choice</li> </ul>				
• Most MTAs also act as Mail Submission Agents (MSAs)				





# Message format (1)

```
From: Philip Hazel <phil@exim.example>
To: Julius Caesar <julius@rome.example>
Cc: Mark Anthony <MarkA@cleo.co.example>
Subject: How Internet mail works
Julius,
I'm going to be running a course on ...
Format was originally defined by RFC 822 in 1982
Now superseded by RFC 2822 (published 2001)
Message consists of
Header lines – some have a well-defined syntax
A blank line – terminates the end of the header
Body lines
Notice that a message is defined in terms of lines
```



## A message in transit (1)

```
• Headers added by the MUA before sending
```

From: Philip Hazel <phil@exim.example>
To: Julius Caesar <julius@rome.example>
Cc: Mark Anthony <MarkA@cleo.co.example>
Subject: How Internet mail works
Date: Mon, 10 May 2004 11:29:24 +0100 (BST)
Message-ID: <Pine.SOL.3.96.990117111343.
 19032A-100000@taurus.exim.example>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
Julius,
 I'm going to be running a course on ...



Headers added by MTAs

Received: from taurus.exim.example ([192.168.34.54] ident=exim) by mauve.csi.example with esmtp (Exim 4.30) id 101qxX-00011X-Ab; Mon, 10 May 2004 11:50:39 +0100 Received: from phil (helo=localhost) by taurus.exim.example with local-smtp (Exim 4.31) id 101qin-0005PB-2c; Mon, 10 May 2004 11:50:25 +0100

From: Philip Hazel <phil@exim.example>
To: Julius Caesar <julius@rome.example>
Cc: Mark Anthony <MarkA@cleo.co.example>
Subject: How Internet mail works
Date: Mon, 10 May 2004 11:29:24 +0100 (BST)
Message-ID: <Pine.SOL.3.96.990117111343.
19032A-100000@taurus.exim.example>
MIME-Version: 1.0

•••

## A message in transit (3)

- A message is transmitted with an *envelope* MAIL FROM:<phil@exim.example> RCPT TO:<julius@rome.example>
- The envelope is separate from the RFC 2822 message
- Envelope (RFC 2821) fields need not be the same as the header (RFC 2822) fields (**From:** and **To:**)
- MTAs are (mainly) concerned with envelopes Just like the Post Office...
- Error ("bounce") messages have null senders
   MAIL FROM:<>
- This is to prevent looping

```
An SMTP session
telnet relay.rome.example 25
220 relay.rome.example ESMTP Exim ...
EHLO taurus.exim.example
250-relay.rome.example ...
250-SIZE 10485760
250-PIPELINING
250 HELP
MAIL FROM: <phil@exim.example>
250 OK
RCPT TO:<julius@rome.example>
250 Accepted
DATA
354 Enter message, ending with "."
Received: from ...
From: ...
etc...
250 OK id=10sPdr-00034H-4B
OUIT
221 relay.rome.example closing connection ...
```

SMTP return codes		
• 2 <i>xx</i> OK		
220 Service ready		
250 Requested mail action okay, completed		
• 3xx Send more data		
354 Start mail input; end with <crlf>.<crlf></crlf></crlf>		
• 4xx Temporary failure		
421 Service not available, closing transmission channel		
450 Requested mail action not taken: mailbox unavailable		
451 Requested action aborted: error in processing		
• 5xx Permanent failure		
500 Syntax error, command unrecognized		
501 Syntax error in parameters or arguments		
503 Bad sequence of commands		
550 Requested action not taken: mailbox unavailable		
554 Transaction failed or no SMTP service here		
	13	

# **Email forgery**

- It is trivial to forge unencrypted, unsigned mail
- This is an inevitable consequence when the sender and recipient hosts are independent
- Most spam contains forged senders and forged header lines
- Be alert for forgery when investigating
- and ...
- Never send automatic spam or virus warnings! If you do, you are just adding to the problem This is known as "collateral spam" or "Joe jobs"

## The Domain Name Service

- The DNS is a worldwide, distributed database
- DNS servers are called *name servers*
- There are multiple servers for each DNS zone
- · Secondary servers are preferably off-site
- Records in the DNS are keyed by type and domain name
- Root servers are at the base of the hierarchy
- Caching is used to improve performance
- Each record has a time-to-live field

#### Use of the DNS for email (1)

- Three DNS record types are used for routing mail
- *Mail eXchange* (MX) records map mail domains to host names They provide a list of hosts, with preferences

hermes.cam.ac.uk. MX 5 green.csi.cam.ac.uk. MX 7 ppsw3.csi.cam.ac.uk. MX 7 ppsw4.csi.cam.ac.uk.

• Address (A) records map host names to IPv4 addresses

green.csi.cam.ac.uk.	Α	131.111.8.57
ppsw3.csi.cam.ac.uk.	Α	131.111.8.38
ppsw4.csi.cam.ac.uk.	А	131.111.8.44

• IPv6 addresses use AAAA ("quad A") records

ahost.csi.cam.ac.uk. AAAA 2001:630:200:...

# Use of the DNS for email (2)

- MX records were added to the DNS after its initial deployment
- Backwards compatibility rule
  - If no MX records are found
    - Look for an address record
    - If found, treat it as an MX with 0 preference (most preferred)
- MX records were invented for gateways to other mail systems They are now used for handing generic (e.g. corporate) mail domains
- SRV (service) records can also be used for email routing This feature is not widely deployed

#### **Other DNS records**

- The PTR record type maps IP addresses to names
- The IP address is inverted, then looked up in *in-addr.arpa* 57.8.111.131.in-addr.arpa. PTR green.csi.cam.ac.uk.
- PTR and address records do not have to be one-to-one

cam.ac.uk. MX 7 mx.cam.ac.uk. mx.cam.ac.uk. A 131.111.8.33

33.8.111.131.in-addr.arpa. PTR ppsw-4m.csi.cam.ac.uk.

• CNAME records provide a general aliasing facility

pelican.cam.ac.uk. CNAME redshank.csx.cam.ac.uk.

#### **DNS** lookup tools

• *host* is easy to use for simple queries

```
host demon.net
demon.net A 193.195.224.1
host 193.195.224.1
Name: finch-staff-1.server.demon.net
Address: 193.195.224.1
host -t mx demon.net
demon.net MX 10 lon1-relay-1.mail.thus.net
demon.net MX 5 lon1-hub-internal.mail.demon.net
demon.net MX 5 anchor-hub-internal.mail.demon.net
```

• *nslookup* is more verbose in both input and output

nslookup bt.net nslookup 192.168.34.135 nslookup -querytype=mx bt.net

• *dig* is the ultimate nitty-gritty tool

dig bt.net dig -x 192.168.34.135 dig energis.net mx

#### **DNS** mysteries

- Sometime primary and secondary name servers get out of step
- When mystified, check for server disagreement
- A second argument for *host* specifies a name server

```
host -t ns xxx.ac.uk
xxx.ac.uk NS mentor.xxx.ac.uk
xxx.ac.uk NS ns0.ja.net
host harvey.xxx.ac.uk mentor.xxx.ac.uk
harvey.xxx.ac.uk A 192.168.1.3
host harvey.xxx.ac.uk ns0.ja.net
harvey.xxx.ac.uk has no A record at ns0.ja.net
(Authoritative answer)
```

## **Common DNS errors**

- Final dots missing on RHS host names in MX records
- MX records point to aliases instead of canonical names This should work, but is inefficient and deprecated
- MX records point to non-existent hosts
- MX records contain IP addresses (not host names) on the right-hand side Unfortunately some MTAs accept this Also, some name server software conspires to support this
- MX records do not contain a preference value

#### Routing a message

- Process locally handled addresses
  - Alias lists
  - Forwarding files
  - Local mailboxes
- Recognize special remote addresses For example, those for local client hosts
- · Look up MX records for remote addresses
- If ourself (the current host) is in the list with preference *P* Discard MX records whose preference is greater than or equal to *P* This logic is for secondary MX servers
- For each remaining MX record, get the host's IP address(es)

### **Delivering a message**

- Perform local delivery
- For each remote delivery Try to connect to each remote host until one succeeds If it accepts or permanently rejects the message, that's it
- After temporary failures, try again at a later time
- Time out after deferring too many times
- Avoid sending multiple copies of the same message to the same host The RFCs recommend single copies with multiple recipients Sometimes single copies are necessary

# <section-header>Checking incoming senders Misconfigured mail software Unregistered domains Misconfigured name servers Forgeries – probably the biggest cause nowadays • Many MTAs check the domain of the sender address • It is harder to check the local part A reverse SMTP "callout" is needed Uses more resources and can be quite slow Controversial when used indiscriminately

# **Checking incoming recipients**

- Some MTAs check each local recipient during the SMTP transaction Rejections are handled by the sending MTA The receiving MTA avoids problems with bad senders
- Other MTAs accept messages without checking local recipients
  - The checks happen later
  - Errors are handled by the receiving MTA
  - More detailed error messages can be generated ...
    - ... but not necessarily delivered
    - ... or delivered to an innocent 3rd party (collateral spam)
- Checking at SMTP time is nowadays very common (because of forgeries) Reduces collateral spam because ratware does not generate bounces

## **Relay control**

- Incoming: From any host to specific domains Example: incoming gateway or backup MTA
- Outgoing: From specific hosts to anywhere Example: outgoing gateway on local network
- From SMTP-authenticated hosts to anywhere Example: travelling employee or customer using a remote network
- Encryption can be used for password protection during authentication
- Authentication can also be done using certificates
- Any other relaying is "open", and is a Bad Thing

## Policy controls on incoming mail

- Block known miscreant hosts and networks Spamhaus project, Realtime Blackhole List (RBL), etc...
- Block known miscreant senders Not as effective as it once was
- Reject SMTP protocol violations Catches some "pump and dump" ratware
- Greylisting temporarily reject unknown senders Has to be used in conjunction with black and white lists Requires continuous management – not that simple...
- Refuse malformed messages
- Refuse virus-laden messages
- Try to recognize unwanted messages (spam)

Discard (danger of false positives)

Annotate (let the end user decide)